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T
ax rates differ substantially across countries and across locations within coun-
tries. An important question is whether people choose locations in response 
to these tax differentials, thus reducing the ability of local and national 
governments to redistribute income and provide public goods. Due to globalization 
and the lowering of mobility costs, it has become increasingly important to pay 
attention to mobility responses when designing tax policy. In this paper, we review 
what we know about mobility responses to personal taxation and discuss the policy 
implications. Our main focus is on the mobility of people, especially high-income 
people, but we will also discuss the mobility of wealth in response to personal taxes.
It is clear that high-income individuals sometimes move across borders to avoid 
taxes. The media is filled with examples of famous people who, often by their own 
admission, engage in such tax avoidance behavior. The Rolling Stones left England 
for France in the early 1970s in order to avoid the exceptionally high top marginal 
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tax rates—well above 90 percent—in the UK at the time.1 Many other British rock 
stars moved to lower tax jurisdictions, including David Bowie (Switzerland), Ringo 
Starr (Monte Carlo), Cat Stevens (Brazil), Rod Stewart (United States), and Sting 
(Ireland). In more recent years, actor Gérard Depardieu moved to Belgium and 
eventually Russia in response to the 75 percent millionaire tax in France, while a vast 
number of sports stars in tennis, golf, and motor racing have taken residence in tax 
havens such as Monte Carlo, Switzerland, and Dubai. 
While these anecdotes are suggestive, two caveats prevent us from drawing 
any broader conclusion from them. First, all of the examples are from the sports 
and entertainment industries. These industries may feature particularly high cross-
border mobility, both because they involve little location-specific human capital and 
because workers tend to be less tied to specific firms. Second, some of the examples 
reflect location responses to extreme top tax rates. The key question—and the one 
with which we are preoccupied in this paper—is if income tax rates distort the loca-
tion choices of broader segments of workers? And if they do, how large are the 
responses and what are the implications for policy? These questions are particularly 
pertinent due to the recent proposals in the United States and elsewhere to raise the 
taxation of income or wealth substantially at the top of the distribution.
Mobility of People
The idea that tax policy may affect the location decisions of individuals has a 
long tradition in economics. In fact, tax-induced mobility is a central mechanism in 
several strands of economic theory. In the local public finance literature, starting 
with the seminal contribution of Tiebout (1956), migration responses to local taxes 
and public goods are the fundamental force that governs the sorting of individuals 
across jurisdictions. Since the contributions of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), the 
field of economic geography has focused on spatial equilibrium models in which 
the assumptions placed on migration elasticities are key determinants of the spatial 
allocation of factors and the geographic variation in prices. The optimal taxation 
literature has also emphasized that migration responses can have important effects 
on tax design and may trigger socially inefficient tax competition in uncoordinated 
tax settings (for example, Mirrlees 1982; Bhagwati and Wilson 1989).
Despite its importance in economic theory and its salience in the policy debate, 
empirical evidence on the responsiveness of individual location decisions to taxes 
has been remarkably scant. Table 1 provides a summary of the available literature, 
focusing on papers that estimate mobility responses to personal income taxes. 
1 Up until 1978, the United Kingdom imposed a top marginal tax rate on labor income equal to 
83 percent and a top marginal tax rate on capital income that was even higher, a stunning 98 percent. 
Very few people had sufficiently high incomes to face these tax rates, but rock stars were among them. 
The 1966 song “Taxman” by The Beatles was an attack on these high tax rates: “There’s one for you, 
nineteen for me/Cause I’m the taxman, yeah I’m the taxman/Should five percent appear too small/Be 
thankful I don’t take it all/Cause I’m the taxman, yeah I’m the taxman.”
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Interestingly, only a dozen papers or so provide direct evidence on such responses 
and most of these papers are very recent. Two empirical challenges can explain the 
paucity of empirical research in this area: the lack of suitable data on migration and 
the lack of credible tax variation for identifying causal effects. 
Information on migration patterns combined with precise measures of earn-
ings and tax rates in different locations is hard to come by. Traditional surveys 
either lack this type of information or are statistically underpowered due to small 
sample sizes. One way of circumventing this data limitation is to focus on alternative 
Table 1 
Summary of Empirical Literature on Migration Responses to Personal Income Taxes
Citation Countries Population Tax variation Main result
Preferred  
mobility elasticity
A: International mobility
Akcigit, Baslandze, 
and Stantcheva 
(2016)
8 OECD  
countries
Top 1% of 
inventors
Variation across/ 
within states  
over time
Top foreign inventors 
are strongly mobile 
internationally
Foreigners = 1
Domestics = 0.03
Kleven, Landais, 
and Saez
(2013)
14 
European 
countries 
Top football 
players
Variation across/ 
within countries  
over time
Top foreign footballers 
are strongly mobile 
internationally
Foreigners = 1
Domestics = 0.15
Kleven et al.
(2014)
Denmark Immigrants in 
the top 1%
Variation by earnings 
within country 
over time
Top foreign earners 
are strongly mobile 
in Denmark
Foreigners = 1.6
Domestics = 0.02
B: Within-country mobility
Agrawal and 
Foremny (2019)
Spain Top 1% of 
population
Variation across  
Spanish regions 
over time
Top taxpayers are 
strongly mobile  
within Spain
0.85
Akcigit et al.
(2018)
8 US  
states
All inventors Variation across/ 
within states over time
Inventors strongly mobile 
within the US
Out-of-state = 1.23
In-state = 0.11
Feldstein and 
Wrobel (1998)
USA Sample of full-
time workers
Variation across  
US states
Wage changes fully  
offset tax changes across 
US states
∞
Liebig, Puhani, 
and Sousa-Poza
(2007)
Switzerland Population 
 aged 21–64
Variation across Swiss 
municipalities over time
College graduates and 
foreigners are mobile 
within Switzerland
NA
Martinez  
(2017)
Switzerland Top 1% in 
canton of 
Obwalden
Variation across Swiss 
cantons over time
Rich taxpayers are 
strongly mobile 
within Switzerland
2.0
Moretti and  
Wilson (2017)
USA Top 5% of 
inventors
Variation across 
US states over time
Top inventors are 
strongly mobile across 
US states
1.8
 Schmidheiny 
(2006)
Switzerland Households  
in and  
around Basel
Variation across  
Swiss municipalities
Rich households  
more likely to move to 
low-tax municipalities
NA
Schmidheiny  
and Slotwinski 
(2018)
Switzerland Foreigners 
below earnings 
threshold
Variation from  
duration threshold 
in tax scheme
Top earners are  
strongly mobile  
within Switzerland
NA
Young et al.
(2016)
USA Millionaires Variation across  
US states
Millionaires only  
moderately mobile within 
the US
0.1
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outcomes, such as wages, and test structural predictions of migration models under 
different assumptions about mobility. Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) provide an early 
example of this approach. Their premise is the following. In the absence of heteroge-
neity in preferences for different locations, a long-run equilibrium equalizes utility 
across locations for all individuals and therefore fixes the net-of-tax wage rate in 
each location. In this case, there is perfect mobility: an increase in the tax rate in a 
given location must be exactly offset by an increase in the wage, because otherwise 
every individual would move out of that location. Testing if the elasticity of wages 
with respect to the net-of-tax rate equals minus one is therefore a test of perfect 
mobility (that is, an infinite mobility elasticity). Using cross-sectional variation in 
the progressivity of state income taxes in the United States, Feldstein and Wrobel esti-
mate very large wage responses to the net-of-tax rate and cannot reject an elasticity 
of minus one. However, their large standard errors imply that, in a number of speci-
fications, they also cannot reject the opposite extreme of small or zero elasticities.
The recent literature has taken two different approaches to overcome these 
data challenges. The first approach is to focus on specific segments of the labor 
market for which detailed migration information is available from external sources. 
Examples include football (soccer) players where rich biographical information 
allows one to reconstruct migration patterns (Kleven, Landais, and Saez 2013), and 
inventors whose location decisions can be inferred from patent records (Akcigit, 
Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016; Akcigit et al. 2018; Moretti and Wilson 2017). The 
second approach is to find contexts in which administrative data with information 
on migration is available. For example, researchers have used tax or social secu-
rity records from countries with a federal structure where the internal migration 
across tax jurisdictions can be observed (Young et al. 2016; Martinez 2017; Agrawal 
and Foremny 2019). Another possibility is to study countries, typically Scandinavian 
countries, that keep migration records of all movements in and out of the country 
that can be linked to administrative tax records (Kleven et al. 2014).
Where suitable migration data is available, the next challenge relates to the tax 
variation used to estimate migration responses. This challenge is twofold. First, one 
needs to measure correctly the tax incentive that governs location decisions. As with 
other extensive-margin decisions, location decisions depend on the average rather 
than the marginal tax rate, and average tax rates are not always straightforward to 
calculate.2 Moreover, for workers at the lower end of the income distribution, the rele-
vant average tax rate depends, not just on the tax system, but also on the potentially 
complicated system of welfare and social insurance programs.3 Second, one needs 
2 Estimating the elasticity of migration with respect to the net-of-tax rate relies on correctly measuring 
the change in the tax incentive (the denominator of the elasticity). Otherwise, the elasticity estimate 
will be biased, even if the reduced-form effect of the reform on migration (the numerator) is correctly 
identified.
3 Despite a long-standing debate about “welfare magnets” (for example, Borjas 1999), there is very little 
conclusive evidence on mobility responses to welfare benefits by low-income people. Agersnap, Jensen, 
and Kleven (2019) provide some of the first causal evidence on welfare magnet effects using variation 
from a special immigrant welfare scheme in Denmark.
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to find tax variation that is plausibly orthogonal to other factors affecting individual 
location choices—including local labor market conditions, local amenities, and public 
goods—and sufficiently large to generate effects that can be detected in the data.
Motivated by these challenges, much of the recent literature has focused 
on people at the top of the earnings distribution. Beyond providing estimates of 
mobility responses for a segment of the population that may be particularly impor-
tant for government revenue and economic efficiency, focusing on top earners 
offers important advantages.
First, for workers with very high earnings, the top marginal tax rate is a reason-
able proxy for the average tax rate and is relatively easy to compute across countries 
and over time (Kleven, Landais, and Saez 2013). Specifically, the top marginal tax 
rate reflects the combined wedge from the top-bracket personal income tax rate, 
uncapped social security taxes on workers and firms, and consumption taxes (value-
added, sales and excise taxes). Second, because of income tax reforms, top marginal 
tax rates exhibit substantial variation over time, both within and across countries, 
offering opportunities to identify the causal effect of taxes on migration. In particular, 
the introduction of preferential tax schemes to high-income foreigners in a number 
of countries provides useful sources of quasi-experimental variation for studying 
mobility responses (Kleven, Landais, and Saez 2013; Kleven et al. 2014). Table 2 
provides details of existing preferential tax schemes in different countries, showing 
that they often introduce very large tax cuts for foreign over domestic workers.
To illustrate the identification opportunities created by the substantial varia-
tion in top marginal tax rates, Figure 1 plots their evolution in twelve countries 
Table 2 
Summary of Preferential Tax Schemes to Foreigners
Country 
Year of 
implementation
Income  
eligibility criterion
Duration  
of scheme
Preferential 
tax treatment
Denmark 1991 Yes 3 years originally, now 
extended to 7 years
Flat income tax of 30%  
originally, now 27%
Finland 1999 Yes 2 years Flat income tax of 35%
France 2004 No 5 years originally, now 
extended to 8 years
30% of taxable income is  
tax exempt
Italy 2011 No 5 years 70% of taxable income was 
exempt originally, now 50%
Netherlands 1985 Yes 5 years originally, now 
extended to 10 years
35% of taxable income was 
exempt originally, now 30%
Portugal 2009 No 10 years Flat income tax of 20%
Spain 2005 Yes since 2010 6 years Flat income tax of 24%
Sweden 2001 Yes 3 years 25% of taxable income is 
tax exempt
Note: In the Netherlands, the 35 percent ruling has been officially implemented by law in 1985, but was 
used in a nonformal way since the 1960s, and was based on a nonpublic internal resolution of the Dutch 
Revenue Service.
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Figure 1 
Top Marginal Tax Rates on Earnings 1980–2015
Note: The figure depicts the evolution of top marginal tax rates on earnings in 12 OECD countries from 
1980 to 2015. Our measure of top marginal tax rates includes top income tax rates, uncapped employer 
and employee payroll taxes, and consumption taxes. Top marginal tax rates on foreigners also account 
for the provisions of foreigners’ tax schemes summarized in Table 2. See online Appendix A for details.
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from 1980 to 2015.4 The rows separate different sets of countries, while the columns 
distinguish between domestic and foreign residents. Several points are worth high-
lighting. First, the top marginal tax rate on domestic residents during this time 
period tends to be largest in northern Europe, intermediate in continental Europe, 
and smallest in English-speaking countries. For example, the top marginal tax rate 
equals 75 percent in Sweden and 48 percent in the United States in 2015. Second, 
this cross-country pattern is less pronounced when focusing on the taxation of 
foreigners, because preferential foreigner tax schemes are more prevalent in high-
tax countries. Third, the introduction of preferential tax schemes to foreigners, due 
to their generosity and design, creates sharp variation in location incentives. 
With this data in hand, a useful preliminary exercise consists in correlating the 
level of top marginal tax rates with the stock of migrants across countries. Beyond 
its descriptive purpose, this serves to illustrate the nature of the identification chal-
lenges and will also put the overall effect of taxes into perspective. Building on Muñoz 
(2019), we use survey data from the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct yearly measures of the stock of 
foreigners in 25 European countries and the United States between 2009–2015.5 
Because our focus is on high-income people, we select individuals with labor earnings 
in the top 5 percent of the distribution in each country and year. We then compute the 
log share of top 5 percent foreigners in the overall population, where foreigners are 
defined as citizens of a country different from their country of residence. In Panel A 
of Figure 2, we plot the average share of top 5 percent foreigners between 2009–15 
against the average top marginal net-of-tax rate over the same period (both variables 
are measured in logs). The figure first confirms the large dispersion in tax rates across 
countries. On the far right of the diagram, eastern European countries like Bulgaria 
and the Czech Republic have high net-of-tax rates due to their flat income taxes with 
4 We combine the top personal income tax rate τi, the uncapped payroll tax rates on employees (workers) 
and employers (firms) τpw and τpf , and the VAT (or sales tax) rates τc in order to obtain our final measure 
of the top marginal tax rate τ :
 (1 − τ) =  
 ( 1 −  τ i ) ( 1 −  τ pw ) 
 ____________
 ( 1 −  τ c ) ( 1 −  τ pf ) 
.
Note that this formula has been written for the standard case where the employer’s and employee’s 
payroll taxes are both based on gross earnings and where the income tax rate applies to earnings net 
of all payroll taxes. When this is not the case, we have adapted our computations to capture precisely 
country-specific rules.
5 The EU Labour Force Survey dataset is the largest European survey of individuals. It is a repeated cross 
section covering roughly 0.3 percent of the overall European population per year since the 1980s. It 
includes detailed income information since 2009. The full list of countries in our analysis is the following: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For top marginal tax 
rates, we extend the series created by Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) and Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 
(2014) to these 26 countries. We provide a complete description of the data and the construction of our 
sample in the online Appendix.
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Figure 2 
Cross-Country Evidence on Mobility Responses at the Top
Note: The figure shows cross-country correlations between log shares of top earning foreigners and log 
top marginal net-of-tax rate on earnings for 25 European countries plus the United States. Shares of top 
earning foreigners are computed from the EU-Labor Force Survey and the Current Population Survey 
for the United States and defined as the number of foreigners who have earnings in the top 5 percent 
of the distribution divided by the total population of residents. The top marginal net-of-tax rate on 
earnings accounts for personal income taxes, uncapped payroll contributions, and consumption taxes. 
Panel A plots the average log share of top foreigners over the period 2009 to 2015 against the average 
log top marginal net-of-tax rate on earnings for foreign residents over the same period. Panel B plots 
the same correlation but in first-difference, focusing on variation between 2009 and 2015. Foreigners in 
the top 5 percent of the wage distribution represent 0.3 percent of the overall population in Belgium, 
0.9 percent in Luxembourg, and 0.01 percent in Bulgaria. The corresponding level of top marginal tax 
rate is 75 percent for Belgium, 50 percent for Luxembourg, and 25 percent for Bulgaria for the same 
period. See text and online Appendix for details. 
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low rates. Interestingly, a country such as Denmark is also located on the far right of 
the diagram because of their preferential tax scheme to foreigners. Second, there 
is also a large dispersion in the share of foreign workers at the top of the earnings 
distribution. While countries like Luxembourg and Switzerland have large fractions 
of foreigners, eastern European countries have small shares. Most importantly, there 
is no sign of a positive correlation between the stock of foreigners and the net-of-tax 
rate. If anything, the correlation is negative: countries with large shares of foreigners 
at the top tend to be those with large tax rates at the top. 
This figure lays bare that many country-specific factors affect migration deci-
sions, and such factors must help to explain why countries such as Luxembourg, 
Belgium, or the United States attract a larger share of high-skill foreigners than 
Romania or Poland, despite having higher top tax rates on earnings. Furthermore, 
the factors that make a country attractive evolve significantly over time, as shown 
in panel B. There we move from a correlation in levels to a correlation in changes 
over time and ask if the share of top foreigners increases more (or falls by less) in 
countries that have reduced their top tax rate by more between 2009 and 2015. We 
find no correlation and see very different trends in the stock of top foreigners across 
countries with no variation in tax incentives. The United Kingdom, for instance, saw 
a large increase in the stock of top foreigners while Ireland experienced a signifi-
cant decline—even though top tax rates were roughly constant in both countries. 
Controlling for all of the nontax determinants of location decisions that vary 
both across countries and over time is critical: any effect of taxes remains domi-
nated and fully masked by such factors in the cross section. 
Quasi-experimental Approaches 
Quasi-experimental approaches leveraging variation in tax incentives across indi-
viduals within the same country over time can effectively control for any unobserved 
nontax determinants of location choices. Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) and 
Kleven et al. (2014) argue that the introduction of special tax schemes to foreigners 
provides such compelling quasi-experimental settings. Consider for instance the 
Danish tax scheme for foreigners, analyzed in detail by Kleven et al. (2014). This 
scheme was enacted in 1992 and applied to the earnings of foreign workers from June 
1991 onwards. Eligibility for the scheme requires annual earnings above a threshold 
located around the ninety-ninth percentile of the earnings distribution. Initially, the 
scheme offered a flat income tax rate of 30 percent in lieu of the regular progressive 
income tax with a top marginal tax rate of 68 percent. The scheme could be used for 
a total period of up to three years, after which the taxpayer becomes subject to the 
ordinary income tax schedule. As shown in Table 2, the scheme parameters—tax rate, 
duration, and so on—have been revised since its introduction. 
The design of the scheme lends itself to a difference-in-differences approach 
in which we compare the evolution of the number of foreigners above the eligibility 
threshold (treatments) and below the eligibility threshold (controls). Such an analysis 
is presented in Figure 3. It shows the stock of foreigners between 1980–2005 in the 
treated earnings range and in two untreated earnings ranges, between 80–90 percent 
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of the threshold and between 90–99 percent of the threshold. The two control series 
are normalized to match the treatment series in the pre-reform year. The graph 
provides exceptionally compelling evidence of mobility responses. The treat-
ment and control series are perfectly parallel in the ten years leading up to the 
reform and start diverging immediately after the reform. The gap between the 
series builds up gradually through the 1990s and then reaches a steady state.6 
The effects are very large: the treatment series more than doubles relative to the 
control series, producing an elasticity of the stock of foreigners with respect to the 
average net-of-tax rate equal to about 1.6. 
While the Danish evidence is very striking, it is important to highlight that 
mobility elasticities—as with other extensive-margin elasticities—are not structural 
6 The similarity between the two control series rules out the main potential confounder, namely that 
foreigners above the threshold are displacing foreigners just below the threshold. In that case, the 
divergence between treatments and controls would not represent a net mobility effect, but a shift in 
the earnings level of foreign arrivals. However, such shifting would produce a dip in the number of 
foreigners just below the threshold relative to the number of foreigners further down. The completely 
parallel trends of the two different control groups, along with other tests provided in Kleven et al. (2014), 
are inconsistent with such a story.
Figure 3 
Migration Effects of the Danish Tax Scheme
Note: Originally produced by Kleven et al. (2014). The 1992 Danish tax reform, represented by a red vertical 
line, introduced a preferential tax scheme for foreign workers with earnings above an eligibility threshold, 
arriving in Denmark in or after 1991. The figure reports the evolution of the number of foreigners with 
earnings above the eligibility threshold from 1980 to 2005. It also reports the evolution of the number of 
foreigners in two control groups: individuals with earnings between 80 and 90 percent of the threshold 
and those with earnings between 90 percent and 99 percent of the threshold. All series are normalized to 
one in 1990, and numbers are weighted by duration of stay during the year for part-year foreign residents.
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parameters. As a result, the findings in Kleven et al. (2014) are not necessarily trans-
portable to other segments of the labor market or to other countries. To see that 
mobility elasticities can vary greatly across labor market segments, it is useful to 
explore heterogeneity across industries in the responses to the Danish tax scheme. 
Motivated by the many examples of tax-induced mobility in music, film, and sports 
discussed in the introduction, Figure 4 splits the difference-in-differences analysis into 
sports and entertainment (panel A) and all other industries (panel B). The effects are 
starkly different across these sectors. While the number of foreigners increased by a 
factor of less than two in other industries, it increased by a factor of more than five 
in sports and entertainment. Much of the dramatic increase in the latter group was 
driven by sports and, in particular, football (soccer) as analyzed by Kleven, Landais, 
and Saez (2013).7 
It is important to note that the mobility responses discussed above pertain to 
the immigration decisions of foreign citizens as opposed to the emigration or return-
migration decisions of domestic citizens. The Danish scheme allows for studying the 
return-migration channel, because the scheme is available to any worker—indepen-
dently of citizenship—who has been a tax resident abroad for at least three years 
(under the initial rules) prior to claiming the scheme treatment. As shown in Table 1, 
Kleven et al. (2014) find that the mobility elasticity of Danish expatriates is extremely 
small. Other papers that were able to identify the mobility elasticities of foreigners 
and domestics separately (Kleven, Landais, and Saez 2013; Akcigit,  Baslandze, and 
Stantcheva 2016) also find much smaller elasticities for domestic workers. This differ-
ence can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that extensive-margin elasticities 
depend on the initial base. In any country, the vast majority of workers are domestic 
citizens rather than foreign citizens. As a result, the elasticity of foreign immigra-
tion represents a percentage change in an initially small stock of foreigners, whereas 
the elasticity of domestic emigration or return-migration represents a percentage 
change in an initially large stock of domestics. This mechanical difference in elastici-
ties is very important for tax policy implications, as we discuss later. 
Mobility elasticities are likely to vary not only by occupation or citizenship 
status, but also across countries within the same segment of the labor force. Indeed, 
an important question to ask is whether mobility elasticities are large only in small 
countries, for the same mechanical reasons that drive the differences in elasticities 
between foreigners and domestic residents. Can elasticities be sizable even for large 
countries that start with a large base of foreigners? Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 
(2016) shed light on this question. They study the effects of top tax rates on the 
international mobility of “superstar” inventors—those with the most and best patents. 
Leveraging panel data from the US and European Patent Offices, they are able to 
track inventors over time and across countries and to exploit the differential impact 
7 The fact that immigration in the sports and entertainment industry starts accelerating after four years 
can be explained partly by regulation in the football sector until 1995. In addition, some sluggishness in 
the ability of firms (such as football clubs) to take full advantage of the scheme is natural due to informa-
tion and hiring/firing frictions.
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Figure 4  
Migration Effects of the Danish Tax Scheme by Industry
Note: Originally produced by Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013). The 1992 Danish tax reform, represented 
by a red vertical line, introduced a preferential tax scheme for foreign workers with earnings above an 
eligibility threshold, arriving in Denmark in or after 1991. The figure reports the evolution of the number 
of foreigners with earnings above the eligibility threshold separately for the sports and entertainment sector 
(panel A) and all other industries (panel B). In each panel, we also report the evolution of the number 
of foreigners in a control group of individuals with earnings between 80 and 99 percent of the threshold. 
All series are normalized to one in 1990, and numbers are weighted by duration of stay during the year for 
part-year foreign residents.
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of top tax rates on inventors at different productivity and therefore income levels. 
They provide several country case studies, two of which are reproduced in Figure 5. 
Panel A considers once again the introduction of the Danish preferential tax scheme 
to foreigners, while panel B considers the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 which sharply 
reduced the top marginal income tax rate. Both panels rely on a synthetic control 
method, where a synthetic country is constructed as a weighted average of the other 
countries in the sample, in order to best fit the pre-reform time series of the treated 
country. The Danish reform shows a significant effect on the share of foreign inven-
tors in Denmark, although the mobility elasticity is smaller than that estimated by 
Kleven et al. (2014) for the full population of high-income workers.8 Importantly, the 
bottom panel suggests that the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a strong effect on the 
growth of foreign superstar inventors. In fact, the estimated mobility elasticity of top 
1 percent superstar inventors for the US economy is extremely large, above 3.
In a complementary paper, Moretti and Wilson (2017) consider the mobility 
responses of star scientists across US states—rather than across countries—over the 
period 1977–2010. They estimate large long-run elasticities of mobility with respect 
to both personal and corporate income taxes. The elasticity of mobility with respect 
to personal income taxes is equal to 1.8. 
Are these tax-induced mobility effects only relevant for modern day economies? 
New historical evidence from Akcigit et al. (2018) shows significant effects of taxes on 
mobility across US states. They study the effects of personal and corporate taxes over 
the twentieth century in the United States, using a new panel of the universe of inven-
tors who patented since 1920; a dataset of the employment, location, and patents of 
firms active in research and development since 1921; and a historical state-level corpo-
rate and personal tax database since 1900. They estimate that, over the twentieth 
century, the elasticity of the number of inventors residing in a state equals 0.11 for 
inventors from that state and 1.23 for inventors not from that state. These findings are 
consistent with the distinction made above, in the contest of international migration, 
between the mobility elasticities of foreigners and domestics.
Mobility of Wealth
So far, we have considered mobility responses to the taxation of labor income. 
However, mobility responses may depend on the tax treatment of both labor income 
and capital income, or on wealth. In general, it is easier to measure tax rates on 
labor income than on capital income and wealth. For the latter, detailed informa-
tion on the income and wealth composition of individuals and their spouses is often 
8 Contrary to the effects on other occupations considered above, there is a lag in the effects of the reform 
on inventors. This can be explained by the fact that an inventor not only has to move to Denmark but 
also patent there, in order to be recorded as having moved to Denmark. Note also that the elasticity here 
can be diluted, because the analysis lumps together inventors across all income levels, some of which are 
not eligible for the foreign tax scheme (income is not observable in the patent data).
132     Journal of Economic Perspectives
Figure 5 
Migration Responses by Inventors
Note: Originally produced by Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva (2016). The figure shows inventors’ 
migration response to two major tax reforms in Denmark and the United States. Panel A focuses on the 
1992 Danish reform, which introduced a preferential tax scheme for foreign workers with earnings above 
an eligibility threshold, arriving in Denmark in or after 1991. The panel depicts the evolution of the share 
of foreign inventors, normalized to one in 1990, in Denmark and in a synthetic control country, constructed 
as a weighted average of all other countries in the sample, in order to best match the pre-reform series for 
Denmark. Panel B focuses on the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which lowered top marginal income tax rates in 
the United States. The panel shows the number of foreign inventors belonging to the top 1 percent of the 
distribution of citation-weighted patents in the United States and in a synthetic control country. Both series 
are normalized to one in 1986.
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necessary. Absent such data, focusing on the top marginal tax rate on labor earnings 
can introduce measurement error in the true tax incentive, especially because some 
countries actively rely on specific provisions of capital taxation to attract foreign 
residents. Belgium is a case in point. Although its top marginal tax rate on earn-
ings is relatively high, the fact that capital gains are exempt from taxation and inter 
vivos gifts are taxed at very low rates are often cited as reasons why a large number 
of wealthy French people have moved their tax residence to Uccle or Ixelles in the 
suburbs of Brussels.
Unfortunately, we still know little about the effects of capital income and wealth 
tax provisions on mobility. The data and identification challenges outlined above 
are, if anything, even stronger when studying the effects of wealth or estate taxa-
tion on migration. The literature is therefore limited to just a few papers. Most of 
them focus on within-country mobility responses to the taxation of bequests. In the 
United States, Bakija and Slemrod (2004) and Conway and Rork (2006) find that 
high inheritance and estate taxes have statistically significant, but modest, negative 
impacts on the number of federal estate tax returns filed in a state. This finding is 
echoed by Brülhart and Parchet (2014), who find that variation in bequest taxes 
across Swiss cantons have little impact on the location decisions of retirees. But the 
recent work by Moretti and Wilson (2019), focusing on individuals from the Forbes 
400 in the United States, suggests that mobility responses to estate tax incentives 
might be larger at the very top of the wealth distribution. 
An emerging literature also estimates taxable wealth elasticities, which in effect 
provides an upper bound on the size of the household mobility elasticity. Using a 
large wealth tax reform in Denmark, Jakobsen et al. (forthcoming) estimate long-
run elasticities of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax return at the top of 
the wealth distribution. They find sizable elasticities, between 0.7 and 1. Using varia-
tion in wealth taxation across Swiss cantons, Brülhart et al. (2019) also find large 
taxable wealth responses. They argue that these responses are not driven by the 
geographic mobility of people across cantons.
However, mobility responses to wealth and capital taxes are not limited to 
the mobility of people, because taxpayers may be able to relocate wealth and 
capital income without changing personal residence. In a perfectly enforced 
residence-based tax system, unless the individual owner changes fiscal residence, 
the geographic location of capital has no impact on tax liability. However, since 
residence-based taxation of capital income and wealth is difficult to enforce 
internationally, there is in practice considerable scope for tax avoidance through 
geographic mobility of capital income and wealth (for example, see Griffith, Hines, 
and SØrensen 2010). In general, we would expect capital to be more mobile than 
people, because it is less affected by the possibly strong and idiosyncratic prefer-
ences for specific locations. 
The early empirical literature on international capital and wealth mobility 
relied predominantly on cross-country correlations. This body of work has been 
summarized by Gordon and Hines (2002) and Griffith et al. (2010). They argue 
that international tax provisions have significant effects on capital allocation, that 
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tax avoidance through foreign investments and wealth holdings is a key threat to 
revenue collection and income redistribution, and that these forces have important 
implications for tax design.9 
The most direct evidence on tax-related wealth mobility comes from recent 
work that uses creative data sources to quantify the amount of unreported wealth 
held in tax havens. Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019) use leaked data 
from HSBC Switzerland and Mossack Fonseca (the so-called “Panama Papers”) 
linked to administrative wealth records in Scandinavian countries. They show that 
the probability of hiding assets offshore rises sharply at the extreme tail of the 
wealth distribution: the top 0.01 percent of the wealth distribution owns about half 
of the leaked offshore wealth. Combining the micro data from specific leaks with 
estimates of the aggregate amount of offshore wealth from macroeconomic statis-
tics (Zucman 2013), they argue that the top 0.01 percent evades about 25 percent 
of its tax liability by moving assets and investment income abroad. They do not esti-
mate the response of such offshoring behavior to tax changes, but their evidence is 
certainly consistent with the presence of substantial tax-induced mobility of wealth 
by the very wealthy. 
Policy Implications
The policy implications of mobility responses to taxes will depend on the 
extent to which tax policy is uncoordinated across countries—that is, a situation in 
which each country sets its tax rate without any international constraints or coopera-
tion—and situations in which there is an element of coordination. We first consider 
uncoordinated tax policy and then turn to the implications of policy coordination.
Uncoordinated Tax Policy
When tax policy is not coordinated across countries, a key issue is whether 
there is targeted taxation of foreigners, as with the many preferential tax schemes 
discussed above, or a population-wide tax scheme applying to both foreign and 
domestic individuals. We start by discussing tax policy targeted to foreigners. 
If the social welfare objective of a given country depends only on its domestic 
residents, the optimal influx of foreigners is governed solely by the externalities they 
generate on the domestic residents. As a result, the optimal taxation of foreigners 
trades off the revenue losses from cutting taxes on immigrants against the externality 
gains of attracting additional immigrants. These externalities include fiscal exter-
nalities—the additional tax revenue collected due to immigration—and non-fiscal 
externalities such as productivity spillovers (positive) and congestion (negative). 
In the absence of any non-fiscal externalities, the policy prescription is particularly 
9 Saez and Stantcheva (2018) derive the optimal tax rates on capital in different settings, including 
when capital income can be shifted abroad and there are different types of capital assets with potentially 
different elasticities.
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simple: the optimal tax rate on foreigners is equal to the Laffer rate—that is, the 
tax rate that brings in the most revenue. In other words, if the government does not 
care about the welfare of the foreigners themselves and if the only externalities they 
create operate through the government budget, then it is optimal to maximize the 
revenue collected from them (Kleven, Landais, and Saez 2013). 
These ideas can be formalized in a relatively straightforward manner. The 
theory of optimal taxation with migration responses was first analyzed by Mirrlees 
(1982) and reviewed by Piketty and Saez (2013) for the case without non-fiscal exter-
nalities, while the theory of welfare analysis with non-fiscal externalities was recently 
laid out in Kleven (2018). To simplify the analysis, let us make two assumptions. 
First, suppose the only behavioral response by foreigners is the migration response; 
labor supply conditional on moving is fixed. Second, suppose that the marginal 
non-fiscal externality from foreign immigration is zero. These assumptions are quite 
strong, but they provide a useful benchmark for developing intuition. Under these 
assumptions, we can show that the optimal tax rate on foreigners, τ F, is given by
 τ F ≡  1 _____ 
1 +  η F 
,
where ηF is the elasticity of the stock of foreigners with respect to the net-of-tax 
rate.10 The elasticity parameter ηF corresponds to the estimates reported in Table 1. 
This tax formula corresponds to the well-known inverse elasticity formula for the 
Laffer rate. 
As mentioned, it is possible that foreign immigrants generate other exter-
nalities than those operating through the government budget. In particular, the 
foreigners targeted by the special tax schemes described above—high-income 
workers, researchers, and scientists—are often considered to have especially high 
positive spillovers. If such positive spillovers are taken into account, the optimal tax 
rate on foreigners would be correspondingly lower.
This discussion, along with evidence reviewed above, highlights the tempta-
tion of introducing preferential tax schemes for foreigners. For example, based on 
the tax scheme to foreigners in Denmark, Kleven et al. (2014) estimates a mobility 
elasticity of 1.6, which under the assumptions above implies a tax rate on foreigners 
of only 38 percent. While this is higher than the scheme’s income tax rate, it is 
lower than the total top marginal tax rate when accounting for social security taxes 
10 This optimal tax rule in the equation can be derived as follows. Given the assumption of separability 
between the externalities from foreigners and the behavior of domestics, we define the external welfare 
effect of foreigners as E F(y F N F ), where y F denotes the average earnings of foreigners and N F denotes 
the number of foreigners. The fact that we write the externality as a function of the aggregate earn-
ings of foreigners, Y F ≡ y F N F , as opposed to the number of foreigners is not crucial. Given foreigners 
are taxed separately at a flat tax rate of τ F, the revenue collected from foreigners equals τ F y F N F. 
Denoting by μ the marginal value of government revenue, the government objective is to maximize 
E F(y F N F ) + μ ∙ τ F y F N F. Absent intensive-margin responses (y F is fixed), this yields the first-order 
condition for τ F equal to (∂ E F / ∂Y F )d N F + μ(d τ F N F + τ F d N F ) = 0. Defining the mobility elasticity as 
η F ≡ (d N F / N F ) / (d(1 − τ F  ) /( 1 − τ F )) and the marginal externality effect in terms of the marginal value 
of government revenue as e F ≡ ( ∂ E F / ∂ Y F ) / μ , we would obtain the optimal tax rule shown here. 
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and value-added taxes (shown in Figure 1). Therefore, despite its apparent gener-
osity, the Danish tax rate for foreigners may actually be higher than optimal. If 
we believe that top-earning foreigners coming to Denmark generate other positive 
externalities, then the optimal tax rate is even lower. In fact, the Danish tax scheme 
was originally motivated, not primarily by fiscal externalities and the Laffer logic, 
but by concerns about “brain drain” and the importance of high-skilled labor for 
economic growth and competitiveness. Our estimates imply that the fiscal externali-
ties alone could justify Denmark’s current preferential tax rate for foreigners. 
While these arguments would seem to justify the use of preferential tax 
schemes to foreigners, a number of important qualifications should be empha-
sized. First, because mobility elasticities are not structural parameters, they may vary 
widely across countries and time periods. In particular, mobility elasticities depend 
mechanically on the size of the tax jurisdiction: a smaller jurisdiction is easier to 
exit. Indeed, as the size of a jurisdiction becomes infinitesimal, the mobility elas-
ticity goes to infinity. Conversely, as the size of the jurisdiction approaches the global 
economy, the mobility elasticity goes to zero. Consistent with these conceptual 
ideas, the recent evidence showing large mobility responses is based predominantly 
on small tax jurisdictions: Denmark, Spanish regions, Swiss cantons, and US states. 
But the incentive to offer low taxes to foreigners is stronger in small countries such 
as Denmark than in large countries such as the United States.11 By the same logic, 
the incentive to offer low taxes is stronger in subnational tax jurisdictions (a munici-
pality or a state) than in a nation as a whole. The mechanical relationship between 
mobility elasticities and jurisdictional size can explain why tax havens tend to be 
small countries (Kanbur and Keen 1993). 
Second, we have characterized the optimal tax policy of a given country not 
accounting for the welfare impact on other countries. Indeed, this formulation of 
the issues involves beggar-thy-neighbor policies done at the expense of other coun-
tries (although the externalities do not have to be symmetric, so the game is not 
exactly zero-sum). Moreover, in the case of special tax schemes targeted to foreign 
residents—unlike broader setting looking at taxes and provision of public goods— 
there is no clear Tiebout-sorting argument to justify the policy. 
Third, the tax policy characterized above takes the policies of other countries 
as given. As analyzed in the literature on tax competition (for example, see Keen 
and Konrad 2013), when one country lowers its tax rate, other countries have an 
incentive to lower their tax rate too. But considering the tax rate series in Figure 1, 
there is no clear indication of a race to the bottom. Following an international trend 
of reducing top marginal tax rates around the 1980s, tax rates have remained rela-
tively flat for the last two or three decades. Some countries have introduced special 
tax schemes to foreigners, but there is no evidence of any broad-scaled retaliation or 
race to the bottom. This might be because these preferential tax rates for foreigners 
11 A potentially offsetting effect is that negative congestion externalities—in the terms used above, the 
nonmonetary externalities from additional foreigners are negative rather than positive—are likely to be 
stronger in small countries.
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have been introduced mostly in high-tax countries and are therefore perceived as 
leveling the playing field, rather than creating an unfair tax advantage. Still, it is 
interesting that almost all of the northern European countries have now introduced 
some version of a special tax scheme to foreigners, which suggests the possibility of 
tax competition between similar countries located in close proximity. 
Finally, the policy implications change drastically if, instead of targeted taxation 
of foreigners, we consider uniform taxation of foreigners and domestic residents. 
Again, under the simplifying assumption that migration is the only behavioral 
response, the Laffer rate in an undifferentiated tax system equals 1/(1 + η), where η 
is the average mobility elasticity on all residents. Because domestic residents consti-
tute the vast majority of the population in most countries, η is approximately equal 
to the mobility elasticity of domestic residents. As shown in Table 1, this elasticity 
is very close to zero, and therefore, the Laffer rate is very close to one. Of course, 
there might be intensive-margin responses like reduced labor effort that lower the 
Laffer rate, but the key point here is that mobility responses across countries are 
not important for tax policy design unless the tax system targets foreign citizen-
ship. This is not necessarily true of mobility responses across tax jurisdictions within 
countries like US states or Swiss cantons, where the relevant mobility elasticity may 
be considerably larger.
Coordinated Tax Policy
In the case of uncoordinated tax policy, each fiscal authority ignores any exter-
nalities that it imposes on other fiscal authorities (for example, Gordon 1983). A 
broadly coordinated tax policy is unlikely to materialize in the near future, even in 
otherwise integrated areas such as the European Union, both because fiscal policy 
is considered a matter of national sovereignty and because the potential gains 
from international tax coordination may be unevenly spread (Griffith, Hines, and 
SØrensen 2010). However, we can contemplate what such a policy would look like. 
The issue of coordinated tax policy encompasses two main aspects. The first 
aspect concerns the level at which such coordination can happen. This leads to the 
question of the optimal size of jurisdiction over which tax policy is coordinated: for 
example, should it include a collection of countries (such as the European Union) 
or a collection of states within a country (such as the United States). The second 
aspect concerns what parts of fiscal policy are coordinated and to what degree. 
On the first issue, a literature on fiscal federalism has studied the efficiency 
trade-offs associated with jurisdictional size (Oates 1972, 1999). Smaller jurisdic-
tions (as mentioned above) will face larger migration elasticities and thus be more 
constrained in their choice of fiscal policy. They will have an incentive to lower tax 
rates, as in the earlier example of the special foreigner tax schemes. On the other 
hand, larger jurisdictions will be less able to cater to the diverse preferences for 
public goods and services among their residents. Diversity of policies, which may 
be valuable, could be lost. As a result, there is a trade-off between the inefficiencies 
from tax competition and the inefficiencies from public goods provision. Another 
challenge for large jurisdictions is an aversion to redistributing to immigrants in the 
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European Union and the United States, which can limit the ability to set progres-
sive tax policy in a large and ethnically diverse jurisdiction (Alesina, Miano, and 
Stantcheva 2018). There may also be political economy frictions and transactions 
costs from administering large jurisdictions, which limit the ability of many coun-
tries to coordinate their tax policies.12 
Regarding the type and degree of coordination, a conceptual distinction arises 
between situations where jurisdictions are constrained to set uniform policies and 
situations where they can—in a coordinated fashion—target taxes, transfers, and 
public goods to the local preferences of each jurisdiction. In the United States, for 
example, the federal government shoulders the bulk of progressive taxation, but 
states and municipalities have additional taxes, transfers, and public goods available 
to cater to their residents. 
To formalize the conceptual ideas, consider a central tax authority such as a 
federal government or a supernational authority who sets tax policy in two regions, 
which we denote by A and B. To begin with, suppose the tax authority can set 
different tax rates in the two regions, τ A and τ B. We define two migration elasticities: 
η A is the (positive) elasticity of migration in region A with respect to the net-of-tax 
rate in that region, while η B is the (negative) elasticity of migration in region B to 
the net-of-tax rate in region A. Let’s also assume that g A is the average, income-
weighted value to the social planner of transferring one unit of income to people 
in region A, while y A and y B denote aggregate incomes in the two regions. For 
simplification, assume that migration responses are the only behavioral responses 
to taxation, as we did in the previous section, and that any non-fiscal externalities 
are zero-sum across the two regions. Finally, assume that the aggregate tax revenue 
is rebated in a lump-sum fashion to all residents in the two regions, although this 
assumption can easily be relaxed. With this structure, it is possible to derive an 
optimal tax rate in region A: 
  τ  A =  
1 −  g  A −  τ  B  η A 
B ∙  y B / y A 
  __________________ 
1 −  g  A +  η A 
 .
The formula for  τ  B is symmetric.13 
12 There is also a small literature on the optimal size of countries more generally (Alesina and Spolaore 
1997), which highlights the trade-offs between the efficiencies and inefficiencies from size. The trade-
offs determining the optimal country size are between economies of scale from size (of which a reduced 
migration elasticity is a special case) and the gains from a diversity of policies adapted to residents’ 
heterogeneous preferences.
13 This formula is derived as follows. Conditional on moving to region A or B, person i has heteroge-
neous, but exogenously given income    y i 
A or  y i 
B . The total income in each region is then  y A ≡   ∑ i∈A  y i 
A 
and  y B ≡  ∑ i∈B  y i 
B . As people can freely migrate, the income in each region is a function of both net-of-tax 
rates, i.e.,  y A =  y A ( 1 −  τ  A , 1 −  τ B ) and  y B =  y B ( 1 −  τ  A , 1 −  τ  B ) . The central authority rebates the total tax 
revenues in a lump-sum fashion to all residents of the jurisdiction (this assumption can easily be relaxed). 
Thus, the consumption of agent i in region A under this tax system is  c i 
A =  y i 
A (1 −  τ  A ) +  τ  A  y  A +   τ  B  y  B . 
People can have idiosyncratic preferences over the regions. Note,  g i  is the marginal social welfare weight 
on agent i to be interpreted as a generalized social welfare weight as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016). Let 
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This formulation clarifies three main distinctions of coordinated policy relative 
to the uncoordinated policy setting considered in the preceding section. First, any 
non-fiscal externalities are internalized by the central tax authority, which no longer 
tries to implement beggar-thy-neighbor policies to benefit one region at the expense 
of the other. If these externalities are zero-sum, as assumed here, they drop out of 
the optimal tax formula entirely. Second, the central tax authority also internalizes 
the fiscal externalities that occur when people move between the two regions. This 
fiscal externality appears in the last term of the numerator and depends on the 
(negative) cross-elasticity of migration between the two regions and on the level of 
taxes in the other region. This term makes optimal taxes higher in both regions, 
all else being equal. Finally, the formula illustrates why it is valuable to differentiate 
policies across regions. Regions with more inequality or with more strongly redis-
tributive preferences, as captured by a lower social welfare weight g A, will prefer 
more progressive tax and transfer systems. However, the degree of progressivity and 
tax diversity is limited by the mobility of people across regions within the fiscal 
union (as captured by  η A 
B) as well as by the mobility out of the fiscal union as a whole 
(as captured by ηA). 
The elasticity of mobility with respect to taxes for region A would be smaller if 
(1) the region is larger (as discussed above), (2) if there is more tax coordination 
with jurisdictions that do not operate under the same fiscal authority, and (3) if 
mobility is lower due to nontax factors such as preferences and other policies. As 
for the latter, regulatory policies such as visa requirements and work permits, or 
transfer policies such as eligibility for welfare benefits and social insurance, may be 
important. Several countries, including France, Spain, and the United States, also 
impose exit or expatriation taxes for residents who decide to leave, which can be 
viewed as another way of trying to reduce the migration elasticity of domestic resi-
dents. Mobility responses to taxes will depend crucially on the local amenities of a 
region, on the public goods and services provided, and on agglomeration effects. 
All these forces also shape the within-jurisdiction cross-elasticity  η A 
B and are plau-
sibly even stronger within jurisdictions. Regions which are more similar in terms of 
amenities and thus more closely substitutable will face higher cross-elasticities and 
will have to set more similar tax rates than in a world without people and income 
mobility. 
us consider the effects of a small change in the tax rate  τ  A ,  dτ  A . First, this reduces each agent’s income 
by  y i 
A d  τ A , which costs  − g i  y i 
A d τ A in terms of social welfare. Aggregating across all agents, the total effect 
is  − ∑ i g i  y i 
A d τ A . In addition, the mechanical effect on revenues (without agents moving regions) equals 
− ∑ i g i  y 
A d τ A . Since people also move regions following the tax change, there is an additional revenue 
effect, equal to  − ∑ i g i  (  τ  
A d  y A 
 _ 
d (1 −  τ  A ) 
+  
 τ  B d  y B 
 _ 
d (1 −  τ  A ) ) d τ  A . Let  η A ≡  
d  y A 
 _
 y A 
  
 ( 1 −  τ  A )  _
d ( 1 −  τ A ) 
  > 0 be the elasticity of income in region 
A to the net-of-tax rate  1 −  τ  A in the region and  η A 
B
≡  
d  y B 
 _
 y B 
  
 ( 1 −  τ  A )  _
d ( 1 −  τ  A ) 
 < 0 be the cross-elasticity of income in 
region B to the net-of-tax rate  1 −  τ  A in region A. The term  g  A ≡   ∑ i∈A g i  y i 
A 
 _
 ∑ i  g i  y 
A 
 is the average, income-weighted 
welfare weight in region A. Setting the three effects to zero, rearranging, and using the definitions in the 
text yields the formula in the text.
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If policies are instead constrained to be uniform across the two regions within 
the jurisdiction, then the ability to differentiate policies and adapt them to local 
conditions is thus lost. 
As discussed above, when considering tax policy setting across independent 
jurisdictions (states or countries), we do not immediately see evidence of a race to 
the bottom. This suggests that some implicit coordination is taking place, perhaps 
because of a fear of retaliation along the tax policy or other margins. On the other 
hand, the preferential tax schemes to foreigners implemented in several countries 
may hint at a slippery slope towards beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Getting rid of 
such schemes would be a limited form of policy coordination that seems welfare-
increasing in our framework and potentially feasible. Partial coordination which 
internalizes some, even if not all, of the welfare gains from full coordination is 
an intermediate solution and already exists between state and local jurisdictions 
in the United States and subnational jurisdictions in other countries. Examples 
include revenue sharing and matching or categorical grants, partially centralized 
provision of public goods, central tax deductibility of local government taxes, 
or regulations concerning what sort of taxes and tax bases may be used by local 
governments. 
Conclusion
There is growing evidence that taxes can affect the geographic location of 
people both within and across countries. This migration channel creates another 
efficiency cost of taxation with which policymakers need to contend when setting 
tax policy. At the same time, we have cautioned against overusing these empirical 
findings to argue in favor of an ineluctable reduction in the level of taxation or 
progressivity. Let us reiterate two key caveats. 
First, while the mobility responses documented in some of the recent literature 
are striking and perhaps surprisingly large, they pertain to specific groups of people 
and to specific countries. Although we are far from having to rely on the celebrity 
anecdotes presented in the introduction, data limitations and identification chal-
lenges have forced researchers to study the migration flows in specific countries 
(like Denmark) or to focus on a specific population internationally (like superstar 
football players or inventors). We are still lacking systematic evidence on the mobility 
elasticities of the broader population and across different types of countries. 
Second, the strength of the mobility response to taxes is not an exogenous, 
structural entity. It depends critically on the size of the tax jurisdiction, the extent 
of international or subnational tax coordination, and the prevalence of other forces 
that foster or limit the movement of people, all of which can also be affected by poli-
cies. These forces include local or national amenities, agglomeration effects, and 
the provision of public goods and services. Rather than compromising redistribu-
tion or restraining free mobility in an inefficient way, these can, in a productive way, 
be fostered to make the country or state attractive to people.
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